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AbSTRACT
The article analyzes how hostility is legalized in different societies and which narratives and dis-
courses are used to make the dominant state ideologies acceptable for citizens. The authors use critical 
discourse analysis methodology to compare the main narratives of  (a) the establishment of  communism 
that was dominant in the Soviet Union and (b) the anti-terrorism movement in the first decade of  the 
21st century, used in the spread of  democratic ideology and justification of  the actions of  different coun-
tries. The Cold War rhetoric in the Soviet Union meant the linguistic militarisation of  life: war rhetoric 
interdiscursively invaded everyday life though the language of  the media and thus became the language 
of  describing everyday life. After the events of  September 11, 2001, a new global confrontation was 
constructed. During the Soviet Union period we fought against international imperialism; now we fight 
against international terrorism. Both main narratives, the one of  the Soviet Union and the one formu-
lated by George Bush (Jnr), are phrased by the political elite and made legitimate through mass media. 
Both narratives are characterized by euphemistic use of  language, because military activity is justified 
by the need to defend democratic values. 
Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis; War Discourse; Anti-Terrorism War; Ideology. 
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of  the present article is to show the linguistic and communicative mechanisms of  the relationship between citizens and 
the state, which help to maintain governmental 
ideological standards, and to observe how these 
mechanisms alter in the specific societal conditions 
of  the changing world. In this context the article 
studies how military activity is made legitimate in 
different societies as an example of  different gov-
ernmental ideologies of  different countries. The 
article also analyzes which narratives and discours-
es are used to make the dominant governmental 
ideologies acceptable to citizens.
The authors use the method of  critical 
discourse analysis to compare the change of  the 
dominant narrative and discourses during the to-
talitarian Soviet Union period, as well as during 
the democratic independence period. They ob-
serve the main narrative of  building communism, 
which was dominant during the Soviet Union 
period, as the basic concept of  communication 
between the citizen and the state, and the main 
narrative of  the anti-terrorism movement in the 
first decade of  the 21st century, which was used to 
spread democratic ideology and justify the activi-
ties of  different countries. 
The research question of  the present article 
lies in the fact that the heads of  state, by using rhe-
torical means and constructive attitudes, manipu-
late the will and the values of  citizens. The actual 
content of  the presented text is concealed as dis-
course in text that is heard and read, and thus the 
real content of  the message is transformed. This 
results in the evolution of  the so-called “half-true 
/ half-false” syndrome. 
The construction of  war discourse in dif-
ferent societies is observed, as well as the linguistic 
choices that help to maintain it, how people are 
mobilized and how military activity is justified. 
Estonian society has lived in the linguistic envi-
ronment of  the Cold War military rhetoric; Esto-
nians have participated in military activity in Af-
ghanistan when we belonged to the Soviet Union 
(1979 – 1982), and also as an independent country 
as part of  nato. Consequently, Estonia has made 
a political-ideological transfer from one Cold War 
era to another, the cold war era of  anti-terrorism. 
The present work analyzes how society, with the 
help of  communication, was mobilized for mili-
tary activity in the totalitarian Soviet Union and 
also as an independent democratic country, after 
the events of  September 11, 2001.
The Soviet Union ideology, that became 
the foundation for all the rhetoric practiced with 
people everywhere in that country, was developed 
from the ideologies of  Marxism-Leninism- Stalin-
ism, which within the discourse analysis of  the So-
viet society have been characterized as one large 
meta narrative. The discursive changes that fol-
lowed the annexation of  Estonia have been called a 
cultural revolution for almost half  a century. It was 
certainly a break, but not so much at the level of  
ideas, because socialism as an ideal was not an un-
known ideology for Estonians. According to Rein 
Ruutsoo (2000: 40), what happened was something 
more – the common denominator of  the bolshe-
vist innovations was a discursive shock not only to 
the intellectuals but to all society. Estonians had to 
acquire not a new ideology but first and foremost, 
the discursive competence of  the Stalinist period, 
and later of  the stagnation period, as well as the 
specific rhetoric that accompanied it and what was 
subsequently called the ‘deep language’ (Radzhin-
ski 2000; Tampere 2003).
The Cold War rhetoric lost its meaning af-
ter the Fall of  the Berlin Wall on November 9, 
1989. The new global contradiction was formu-
lated into rhetoric in 2001, after the fall of  the 
twin-towers. Also the anti-terrorism narrative is 
observed as one of  the central narratives in the 
paper, because it has developed into one of  the 
most powerful global narratives in the new mil-
lennium and the world´s field lines are divided by 
it and military activity is organized according to 
it. The present paper observes the development 
of  the new war discourse into one of  the main-
stream discourses mobilizing society. 
The discourse of  anti-terrorism has be-
come the centre of  the political rhetoric of  the 
present century, although the terrorist attacks are 
more marginal compared to, for instance, the 
problems of  aids or organized crime. About 500 
million crimes a year are registered on the globe 
The Cold War rhetoric lost 
its meaning after the Fall of the 
berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. 
The new global contradiction was 
formulated into rhetoric in 2001, 
after the fall of the twin-towers. 
Also the anti-terrorism narrative 
is observed as one of the central 
narratives in the paper, because 
it has developed into one of the 
most powerful global narratives in 
the new millennium. 63
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and it is believed that their real number is twice 
as big. At the same time the battle against terror-
ism has become the main discourse of  countries’ 
foreign policy. According to Markku Kangaspu-
ro (2004), there is a danger that the rhetoric of  
anti-terrorism enables speakers to hide their real 
objectives and obscure the real content. Because 
of  that, the deep language, which began in a to-
talitarian society with the experience of  the So-
viet Union and was later successfully practiced, 
has transferred over to the spoken language of  
democratic societies.
Therefore, the analysis of  war discourse 
presented in the article is important, as is the 
comparison of  how war discourse is used in to-
talitarian and democratic societies to mobilize 
people and shape public opinion in order to sup-
port war activity. The means are similar in fact, 
even though the governmental political ideologies 
are fundamentally different. 
CRITICAL LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 
OF TExTS
According to Michel Foucault (1992/1977: 
48-49), every society has its own regime of  truth, 
its own discourses, which are accepted and which 
are made to function as truthful; there are mech-
anisms and instances, which allow the separa-
tion of  true and false slogans; there is status for 
those who are allowed to say things that func-
tion as truthful. The political economy is char-
acterized by five traits.(i) “The truth” has been 
focused around the form of  the discourse and 
the institutions producing it, (ii) it is subjected to 
a continuous economical and political pressure, 
because both economic production, as well as po-
litical power, need the truth (iii) it is an object of  
‘spreading and consuming’ - it circles in the edu-
cational system and communication channels, (iv) 
it is developed and spread under the influence of  
large political or economic institutions (university, 
army, media) and (v) it is re-produced within ideo-
logical debates. 
Discursive power relations are established 
in society by different methods. People accept 
these beliefs (or truths), that seem authoritative 
to them and are presented through prestigious 
channels. Therefore, through the media the pub-
lic is influenced by scholars, experts, professionals, 
opinion leaders, different social agents. (Teun Van 
Dijk 1998: 9.) 
The study focuses on the analyses of  nar-
rative, argumentation and vocabulary in different 
social practices, in societal context. Discourse, ac-
cording to Norman Fairclough (1999), is a social 
behaviour, that appears in language, and by which 
social reality is created. The reality is interpreted 
and fixed through words within the process of  
creation. The analysis of  discourse concentrates 
on the construction of  a social reality. The aim of  
the discourse analysis is to prove general supposi-
tions on natural matters hidden in the language. 
Through text analysis, discourse analysis tries to 
find contradictory components, hidden in the 
text, that are not directly revealed, but still exist. 
Fairclough’s (1999) attempt at drawing to-
gether language analysis and social theory focuses 
upon a combination of  this more social-theoret-
ical sense of  ‘discourse’ with the ‘text-and-inter-
action’ sense in linguistically-oriented discourse 
analyses. This concept of  discourse analysis is 
three-dimensional. The discursive ‘event’ is seen 
as being simultaneously a piece of  text, an in-
stance of  discursive practice, and an instance of  
social practice. The ‘text’ dimension attends to 
language analysis of  texts. The ‘discursive prac-
tice’ dimension, such as ‘interaction’ in the ‘text-
and-interaction’ view of  discourse, specifies the 
nature of  processes of  text production and 
interpretation. For example, which types 
of  discourse (including ‘discourses’ in 
the more social-theoretical sense) 
are drawn upon and how they are 
combined. The ‘social practice’ 
dimension addresses issues of  
concern in social analysis 
such as the institutional 
and organisational cir-
cumstances of  the dis-
cursive event and how 
this shapes the nature 
of  the discursive prac-
tice, and the consti-
tutive/constructive 
effects of  discourse 
referred to above. 
This approach 
is effective for the 
analysis of  commu-
nication in the new 
social and cultural 
situation, because 
much more con-
servative and tradi-
tional combinations 
of  methods are not 
as exhaustive and 
do not provide the 
possibility of  seeing 
social and cultural 
influences as deeply 64
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and specifically as required by the present au-
thors. Discourse analysis is also a good method for 
studying ‘deep language’ (Tampere 2003), and the 
syndrome of  ‘lies’, because this technique makes 
it possible to read ‘between the lines’ of  texts and 
meta-texts.
Discourses and narratives “simplify” 
(“translate”) economic and political relations. 
Narratives are discourse-relative i.e. narratives 
are the “stories” of  crisis associated with particu-
lar discourses. Which competing discourses (nar-
ratives, imaginaries) and which strategies, succeed 
in establishing themselves depends upon a num-
ber of  factors:
● “Structural selectivity’s”: structures are more 
open to some strategies than to others;
● The scope and “reach” of  the discourse (na-
rrative);
● The differential capacities and power of  the 
social agents whose strategies are “to get their 
message across”, e.g. their access to and con-
trol over mass media and other channels and 
networks for diffusion;
● The “resonance” of  discourses, their ca-
pacity to mobilize people, not only in the 
institutions but also in the lifeworld. 
(Fairclough 2005a: 55-56.)
Fairclough´s (2005: 61) in-
terdiscursive analysis is used in 
the text analysis of  the present 
article. Interdiscursive analy-
sis of  text is an analysis of  the 
specific articulations of  different 
discourses and styles that char-
acterize a particular text. It also 
takes a profoundly relational view 
of  change – for instance, changes 
in discourses are characteristically 
not simply the substitutions of  one 
discourse for another, but changes 
in relations between discourses, 
a new articulation of  discourses, 
which includes prior discourse. 
Fairclough has been active 
in sociolinguistic research, study-
ing text vocabulary, grammar and 
semantics. If  linguistic analysis is 
done at the micro level and social 
analysis at the macro level, then 
critical discourse analysis grasps 
both of  these. 
Firstly, the authors of  the 
present study ask, what dominant 
narratives and future strategies are 
used to maintain ideological beliefs and keep 
people mobilized, in which institutions these nar-
ratives are created, how they are developed into 
dominant discourses through media.
If  we analyze the way discourse turns into 
a dominant strategy, we need to observe the fol-
lowing issues. In which research centres and insti-
tutions is the dominant narrative phrased? How 
and where did these receive a hegemonic status? 
How is the order of  discourse maintained? (Fair-
clough 2005b: 5-6.) Which are the social agents 
who enforce their message and how are these 
messages spread in media channels?
Secondly, linguistic analysis is observed. 
How does the use of  language make the domi-
nant narratives legitimate? What is the dominant 
discourse that linguistically and interdiscursively 
enters other spheres of  life? 
Fairclough’s (1992, 1999, 2001, 2005a) 
analysis structure has been used in the work. Fair-
clough recommends studying the experiential 
value included in words:
● Which classification schemes are relied on?
● How does the construction of  us/them take 
place linguistically?
● Are there keywords (which have cultural 
importance; which have different/changing 
meanings; which have significant potential)?
● Are there neologisms?
● Are there euphemisms?
● How is the word “democracy” used as a eu-
phemism to legitimize the existing ideology?
Critical discourse analysis is used as a meth-
od to study narratives and language use. It is a 
comparative analysis, which studies the compari-
son of  the main narrative dominating in the Soviet 
Union and in anti-terrorism activity. The authors 
of  the article rely on different discourse analyses 
in the context of  the societal usage of  language; as 
a result conclusions are partly selective, but at the 
same time characteristic in relation to contexts. 
CONSTRUCTION OF WAR-DIS-
COURSE IN ThE SOvIET UNION
In the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism-
Stalinism became one of  the most influential sys-
tems/ideologies of  the century, which in studying 
the discourse, has been characterized as a meta-
narrative, which includes the theories of  truth 
and historical progress, and treatments of  future 
(David Horwarth 1995: 118).
When we observe which institutions of  
the Soviet Union phrase the dominant main dis-
courses and maintain the order of  discourse, then 65
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in the Soviet Union the right to change and re-
phrase ideologically important constructions of  
thought belonged to the political elite who acted 
through the system of  the communist party and 
who owned the monopoly of  truth. Only the par-
ty congress could change the established national 
standard; in this respect the generally recognized 
standpoint, that the evolving treatment of  society 
and philosophy which was formulated mainly at 
the party congress level, was absolutely adequate 
at the time. The principal task of  the communist 
party congresses during the stagnation period was 
mainly to ensure that nothing had changed sig-
nificantly. (Ruutsoo 2000: 29.)
Maarja Lõhmus (1999: 68) claims that the 
ruling ideology of  the Soviet Union included 
eight principal myths:
● the myth of  the October Revolution victory 
and the new era,
● the myth of  the creator Lenin and the party,
● the myth of  the uniform family of  the Soviet 
countries as a society without contradictions, 
which has many enemies “outside”,
● the myth of  the Great Patriotic War and the 
invincibility of  the Soviet Union,
● the myth of  the development of  socialism 
and the future of  communism,
● the myth of  the liberated and happy Soviet 
man,
● the myth of  work and the working class as the 
ruling force,
● the myth of  the flourishing of  the Soviet eco-
nomy.
Thus the dominant narrative was related to 
building communism. All media at that time had 
to create and support these myths. Creating and 
upholding the discourse of  a successful winner, 
manipulating texts, editing purposefully and cen-
soring, gave an opportunity to construct reality in 
the spirit of  the dominant ideology. 
The order of  the discourse was 
upheld in the following way. Cer-
emonial party events took place 
with certain regularity and were 
broadcast in the media accord-
ing to a very specific scheme. A 
regular institutionalized, con-
tinuous, signal repeated after 
short intervals was suitable as 
news forwarded to media – a 
specific repeated message. An 
event had to be chosen that 
was not specific from the 
viewpoint of  the established 
ideology, that its interpretation codes were exist-
ing. An unexpected event was not an event, no 
problems of  societal organisation and ideology 
existed. A model example of  the ordinary was a 
working class hero, who at the same time was one 
of  many. (Lõhmus 1999: 74-75.)
The party principle governing journalism 
was absolute. The party principle was also ac-
knowledged as the underlying principle of  activity 
for all cultural and social institutions (Høyer, Lauk, 
Vihalemm 1993: 177). Considering Marju Lauris-
tin’s and Peeter Vihalemm’s research (Vihalemm 
& Lauristin 2001) on media and communications 
in the Soviet Union, it is possible to say that jour-
nalism served public relations and communication 
management functions in the Soviet Union: there 
was no free media in communist society. This ac-
tion was a one-way asymmetrical communication 
– an ideological, political struggle for an abstract 
‘better communist future’. In this process the roots 
were holy and ideological. After a few years, devel-
opments changed the ideology: it separated from 
Marx’s concept and started to serve the ‘Nomen-
clature’. (Høyer, Lauk, Vihalemm 1993: 176.) 
The treatment of  communism based on 
Lenin’s doctrine looked upon journalism as a 
major part of  the political system. To quote a 
well-known saying by Lenin, journalism had to 
be and in fact was, ‘Not only a collective propagandist 
and a collective agitator, but also a collective organiser’ (V. 
Lenin, The Tasks of  the Soviet Power Next in Turn). 
Lenin drew a parallel between journalism and the 
scaffolding around a building; journalism should 
serve as a means of  communication between dif-
ferent groups of  the Party and the people, thus 
fostering joint construction of  the edifice of  com-
munism. The Russian Bolshevik Party under 
Lenin’s guidance, and dozens of  other commu-
nist parties, viewed culture and communication 
pragmatically, discerning in them a Machiavel-
lian means of  gaining power. In its 
treatment of  journalism, Leninist-
Communist doctrine rested upon 
the following logic (Høyer, Lauk, 
Vihalemm 1993: 177):
● history is the struggle bet-
ween classes
● every person must inevita-
bly take sides with one of  
the classes in society
● spontaneous movement 
and the natural evolution 
of  events can only lead to 
the domination of  bourgeois 
ideology66
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● in order to defeat bourgeois ideology, it is 
necessary to arouse the workers’ class-cons-
ciousness, to organise and discipline them, 
thus changing them from a class in itself  to a 
class for itself
● the above goals can be realised by the Party 
that uses journalism for this purpose.
Ideology persisted as an explanatory model 
of  society presented in standard ideological lan-
guage, which compelled the following the ruling 
conventions (Ruutsoo 2000: 29). It was text cre-
ation that included specific linguistic play. Text 
had to include certain specific expressions and re-
flect previously agreed attitudes. Thus a particular 
tradition emerged that in order to get permission 
to publish a book, the linguistic “play” and obliga-
tory citations were placed in the introduction. 
Text editing meant sticking to the ideologi-
cal discourse, because it was believed that even 
the smallest change in this discourse could be 
dangerous and harmful and give some clue to a 
potential enemy. Soviet journalism had to keep 
people passive and in an undefined state, the real 
imaginary discussion through the media took 
place with possible ideological enemies, who were 
taken into consideration more than the local peo-
ple. (Lõhmus 1999: 79.) 
Communist ideology created its own com-
munication style, referred to as ‘deep language’ 
(Radzinski 2000, Tampere 2003). This refers to 
a style of  utterances, both orally and in written 
texts. Lenin initiated its use during the revolution. 
The whole process was clandestine and people 
were called to violent resistance with sentences 
such as ‘We hope that it will be a peaceful dem-
onstration’ – in fact, an appeal for a very bloody 
demonstration. ‘Deep language’ was also system-
atically developed by Stalin. For example, Stalin’s 
statement announcing the promotion of  a com-
rade in reality was his/her death sentence. ‘Deep 
language’ was preserved in the language use of  
subsequent state leaders in different forms, de-
pending on the activity of  the Party and the per-
sonality of  the leader. Over time it was ingrained 
in all of  society because people understood that 
it was safer and more beneficial to use the same 
style as the leaders. This style was characterised 
by a ‘syndrome of  lies’, which meant that in order 
to understand the actual content of  information 
one had to read ‘between the lines’ and have a 
critical attitude towards texts. This style was born 
at the same time as the practice of  communist 
ideology and it was typical of  the whole period 
in many respects. It was one of  the instruments 
of  the Communist Party for controlling and influ-
encing people. 
According to Daniel Weiss (2005: 255) 
Soviet propaganda constituted a well-organized, 
semantic whole which affected the very heart of  
sentence semantics. As for universal and existen-
tial quantifiers, their assignment to their own or 
another group, respectively, is well justified in a 
collectivist ideology. The we-group is character-
ized by total harmony and consensus. It dedicates 
itself  totally to the building of  socialism, it unites 
in the total hatred against the Fascist enemy, it 
mourns over the loss of  its beloved leaders with 
total sadness etc. 
During Stalinism the name of  the enemies 
in Soviet Union were spies, traitors, pests, parasites, 
spongers, loafers, shirkers, not to speak of  the old ene-
mies inherited from the revolution, who were later 
eliminated in the homeland of  socialism, such as 
capitalists, imperialists, landowners, the clergy, etc. This 
holds in particular for the most popular ones, e.g. 
kulak (a wealthy peasant) and vrag naroda (people’s 
enemy). To these one may add formalist, which 
specialized in denigrating representatives of  art, 
music and literature. The Soviet enemy was more 
often not portrayed because he was conceived of  
as hidden and masked. (Weiss 2005: 264.)
The Post-Stalinist rhetoric became a sepa-
rate discourse in the Soviet Union: society was 
mobilized to fight against the enemy, international 
imperialism. The construction of  cultural-linguistic 
closeness took place under the name of  Home-
land-discourse, which functioned as an ideologi-
cal icon of  shaping the collective consciousness 
(Borisov 2009: 125). The Cold War rhetoric was 
supported by the Soviet Union mass culture, 
where war films, mainly of  World War II, played 
an important part. The field of  sports was also 
harnessed in front of  the ideological propagan-
En las notas de Página 12, se mencionan explícitamente 
los ataques sexuales de los que resultaron víctimas las dos 
menores, y evoca que la judicialización y la negación ante el 
pedido de interrumpir el embarazo en los tres casos es una 
violación a los derechos que tienen las mujeres.
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da carriage and related to defending the home-
land and was placed under the rhetorical slogan 
“ready to work and to protect the homeland”. 
One of  the main problems of  Soviet jour-
nalism was the fight with an imaginary enemy. 
An example of  a model text ie. canon (based on 
L. Brezhnev nlkP xxv congress speech) is the 
following: “There is no place for neutrality or 
compromise where two worldviews clash. This 
demands political alertness, active, operative 
and convincing propaganda work and timely 
counter-attack against hostile ideological diver-
sions.” (Lõhmus 1999.)
The signs of  power discourse can be seen 
in the pervasive hinting about war sufferings and 
achieved victory as a consolidative discourse and 
construction of  the leader cult. The Hungarian 
disturbances were described as a rebirth of  the Fas-
cist fireplace. (Anu Mõistlik 88-114.)
Totalitarian systems are characterized by 
the emergence of  the so called new man through 
new vocabulary. The post-occupational Estonian 
vocabulary changed significantly. Such new dis-
course keywords appeared in the language as 
Soviet Empire, Soviet republic, krai, oblast, city council, 
district committee, people´s court, security organs, party 
committee, comsomol, pioneer organisation, assemblyman, 
active voice of  the party. The ideological work and 
its forms characteristic of  the Soviet Union are 
represented by such words as communism builder, 
restoration, idealism, revolutionary, self-criticism, party 
membership, principality, ideological-political, political 
education, speed meeting, Sunday event, agitation brigade, 
propaganda work, party education network, political circle, 
election campaign, October celebration, the turn of  June, 
democratize (Aava 2003: 113.)
The Soviet lifestyle was considered a new 
form of  societal relations between people. It in-
cluded such traits as free work, creativity, collectivism, 
creative independence, power of  people, friendship of  na-
tions, the Soviet people´s certainty about tomorrow, commu-
nist target, of  a party, optimism, loyalty to the revolutionary 
ideals, socialist humanism, Soviet patriotism, internation-
alism, moral purity (Lõhmus 1999: 70).
The demonstrative will for peace of  the 
Soviet people, demonstratively opposed to the 
alleged aggressiveness of  the capitalist world, 
was reflected by such words as peace holder, peace 
fighter, peace event. During the armament race 
period, these words were used as euphemisms. 
Words and terms were used with a meaning that 
had shifted from the original; a phenomenon 
was often replaced by its antonym. For example, 
“deterioration of  economy” was called “economic devel-
opment”, “deterioration of  national culture” was called 
“flourishing of  national culture”. All totalitarianism 
produces linguistic play where words mean the 
opposite: the Soviet Union was called “demo-
cratic” and its politics were a “policy of  peace”, the 
country was engaged in active “defensive arma-
ment”. The above examples are also character-
istic as examples of  communication on a deep 
language principle – new texts and contexts de-
veloped together with life and history, into which 
ideological message was encoded and which in 
a way fooled the receivers of  messages, because 
reality and constructions within government 
rhetoric were increasingly difficult to separate 
(Aava, 2003; Lõhmus, 1999).
Depicting the Soviet man was totally can-
onized in journalism at that time, because this 
was one of  the foundation myths. Work (for the 
benefit of  communism) was considered to be the 
most important necessity of  life for the Soviet 
man. Media discourse prescribed relating work 
to an heroic deed. The hero-theme was impor-
tant; a hero always fought, either in war for the 
homeland or with difficulties at the work front. 
Specific styles developed for depicting the Soviet 
myths and outlook. For example, the “nobleman” 
depicted in high style was the worker (fighter), his 
attribute was hammer (weapon), his environment 
factory (battlefield) (Lõhmus, 1999: 71). Whereas 
people are motivated to work for remuneration in 
a capitalist society, in a totalitarian society, people 
are motivated to work in the name of  heroic fame. 
A pervasive topic in the media was the so-
cialist fight, work victories as a specific form of  
patriotism and construction of  democratic elec-
tions in the media. Permanent constructions 
dominated in media texts: the Soviet Union was 
“the land of  victorious socialism and democracy” 
where “the ruling forces were really national in 
character” , “true democracy” governed the Sovi-
et Union, and a permanent construction “roaring 
applause” accompanied the leader cult. (Mõistlik, 
2007: 83-84).
Stalinist colonial and cultural imperialism 
didn´t leave any room for Estonian national and 
cultural identity. The citation-language also ob-
The signs of power discourse can 
be seen in the pervasive hinting about 
war sufferings and achieved victory 
as a consolidative discourse and 
construction of the leader cult.
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structed such floating markers as freedom, dignity, 
democracy etc., which usually can also be discur-
sively mobilized under the control of  authoritar-
ian regimes (Ruutsoo, 2000: 41).
Based on interdiscursive analysis it can be 
said that the worldview was constructed in media 
through the discourse of  war and fighting, politi-
cizing and militarizing of  everyday life took place, 
man was depicted through heroic struggle. Thus 
military vocabulary entered everyday life. The 
Great Patriotic War victory narrative was revived 
through rendering work as heroic via keywords 
and permanent constructions such as: victories at 
work front, working hero, socialist fight, victory of  work, 
army of  workers. 
The great bolshevist narrative exhausted 
itself  with perestroika and lost its importance in 
the eyes of  the rulers. Within the widening dis-
cursive practices, new discursive collectives had 
developed (Ruutsoo 2000: 58-59).
DISCOURSE OF ANTI-TERRORISM
When the Cold War rhetoric lost its actual-
ity, a new ideological opposition developed after 
the events of  September 11, 2001. The phrasing 
of  the new opposition was adopted from Samuel 
Huntington´s (1996) book “The Clash of  Civiliza-
tions”. Huntington solidified his contentious diag-
nosis that the world was entering a new phase of  
geopolitical dynamics, characterized by a clash of  
primordial civilizations. Academically, his thesis 
drew scathing criticism. At a more popular level, 
the image he drew of  a globe divided along clear 
civilizational lines, with Islam and the West repre-
senting two of  the major opponents, has attained 
a mythic quality. Since the attack on the World 
Trade Center in September 2001, the media has 
played a crucial role in the developing discourse 
on contemporary terrorism. 
The new narrative, which has been for-
mulated by the president of  the USA and his 
administration, has very quickly become one of  
the most influential global narratives. As the pres-
ident of  the world´s most authoritative country, 
George Bush was able to rapidly find audience for 
the new narrative in global media and to describe 
the new world order in his wording. The vocab-
ulary of  the new discourse has been adopted in 
the media. According to Ulrich Beck (2002: 39) 
September 11th stands for the complete collapse 
of  language.
According to Phil Graham, Thomas Keen-
an, Anne-Maree Dowd (2004), the speech given 
by George W. Bush five days after the September 
11 terrorist attacks, demonstrated the continued 
dominance of  the nation-state as the primary 
source of  legitimate political power at the turn of  
the twenty first century. The Bush speech, aimed 
at encouraging American citizens to support his 
impending “war on terror”, appealed to nation-
alistic sentiments. Bush conflated a millennium 
of  external sources of  legitimacy: by drawing on 
discourses of  nationalism, heroism, and national 
work ethic; by drawing on the authority and sup-
port of  God with the nation-state; by announc-
ing a national crusade against a new kind of  evil. 
Bush had a very elastic definition of  an “evil”. 
Others: evil-doers, terrorists, suicide bombers; barbaric, 
evil people who burrow their way into society and lurk in 
order to kill innocent people. 
According to Michel Ryan (2004) Ameri-
cans struggled after September 11, 2001 to cre-
ate universal meaning within a symbolic system 
in which many traditional meanings were shat-
tered. Languages that Americans used before 
the attacks to help them to cope with and to un-
derstand (or to frame) reality did not serve them 
well after attacks. Americans were no longer 
sure about the meaning of  such words as safety, 
security, terrorism, peace, progress, war and American. 
Political and religous leaders, citizens and the 
media seek during crises to create narratives that 
explain and assign meaning to events or issues. 
Federicia Ferrari (2007: 606-619) investigated 
George Bush’s political discourse of  ‘preventive 
war’. Fear strategy by Americans was established 
to justify the need for “homeland protection”. 
The opposing logic, with which post 9/11 has 
been treated, recalls that bipolar ideological cli-
ché typical of  Cold War discourse. 
Editorial writers for the 10 largest newspa-
pers in the US, created a singular symbolic nar-
rative about possible military strikes in that new 
kind of  war. The creation of  the war narrative was 
according to M. Ryan (2004: 377) an exercise of  
power. The symbolic codes were interpreted to 
suggest the terrorist attacks were acts of  war, and 
the American response must include military in-
tervention. This war frame was not seriously chal-
lenged in the 104 editorials. 
The new narrative, 
which has been formulated 
by the president of the USA 
and his administration, has 
very quickly become one of 
the most influential global 
narratives. 69
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According to Douglas Kellner (2005) the 
mainstream media priviledged the “clash of  
civilization“ model, established a binary dual-
ism between Islamic terrorism and civilization, 
and largely circulated war fever and discourses 
that called for and supported a form of  military 
intervention. Kellner also shows how corporate 
media ownership, linked with a rightward shift 
of  establishment media, has come to dominate 
news coverage and distract the public from the 
substance of  real public issues. Exploring the 
role of  media spectacle in the 9/11 attacks and 
subsequent Terror Wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, Kellner documents the centrality of  media 
politics in advancing foreign policy agendas and 
militarism. 
The Bush Administration was unambigu-
ous in its definition of  the 9/11 situations: the 
U.S. had been invaded by evil people who hated 
“the American way of  life.” Who caused the 9/11 
attacks is an empirical question in the intellectual, 
rational, and legal modes of  discourse; the answer 
requires resource-consuming investigations. In a 
religious mode of  discourse, one can answer such 
questions immediately with a statement such as 
“evil caused the attacks” (Chang, Mehan, 2006: 
18). The Bush administration with help from 
many world leaders was framing its own narra-
tive; they successfully framed the world as polar 
opposites (Ryan, 2004: 378). 
One ideologically important keyword, that 
is adopted in political rhetoric and which is used 
to mobilize the opposition, is the crusade metaphor. 
The notion of  a crusade is used by Bush (2001) 
in his speech, where he states, “This crusade, this 
war on terrorism, is going to take a while”. George 
Bush (2001) gives a very elastic definition of  
an evil. Other words he used: evil-doers, terror-
ists, suicide bombers; barbaric, evil people. They can’t 
stand freedom and hate what America stands for.
The crusade narrative became the 
marker of  a great opposition, which was also 
widely used in the international media. “This 
is a pure Zionist crusade,” claimed Muam-
mar al-Gaddafi, using Al-Qaeda rhetoric, af-
ter French air force missiles had hit their first 
targets in Manghaz. In any case, the newly 
emerged contemporary interest towards the 
history of  the crusades is directly connected 
to international relations. After the collapse 
of  the WTC twin towers, western book-
stores were filled with general treat-
ments of  the crusades; previously 
such publishing was unthinkable 
for publishing houses. (Tiit Alek-
sejev 2011.)
Ulrich Beck (2002: 44-45) asks: Who de-
fines the identity of  a trans-national terrorist? Nei-
ther judges, nor international courts, but powerful 
governments and states. Terrorist enemy images 
are de-territorialized, de-nationalized and flexible 
state constructions that legitimize the global inter-
vention of  military power as self-defence. Bush in-
sisted that permanent mobilization of  the Ameri-
can nation was required, that the military budget 
be vastly increased, that civil liberties be restricted 
and that critics be chided as unpatriotic. The ter-
rorist threat was reproduced by the global media. 
War propaganda is also connected to mass 
culture and computer games, where the player 
can fight against Islam terrorism. The movie 
“Black Hawk Down”, based on the events in Soma-
lia in 1992 and a computer game also based on it, 
can be cited as an example of  this. In turn Hez-
bolla has created war games, where one can fight 
against “the new western colonialism.” (Machin, 
Van Leewen, 2007.)
Already familiar rhetoric from the Cold 
War period is used to justify new war activity. 
Larry Diamond (2002: 16), “Winning the New 
Cold War on Terrorism: The Democratic-Gover-
nance Imperative“: One of  the main sources of  
terrorism is chronically bad governance. The in-
ternational campaign against terrorism can thus 
be characterized as a new Cold War: a strategy 
for victory requires the creation of  regimes that 
can achieve the universal goals of  freedom and 
development.”
According to Jules Lobel (2001: 24) the end 
of  the Cold War did lead to some relaxation of  
the feeling of  perpetual crisis that had pervaded 
post World War II America. The 1990s witnessed 
the United States defense against various threats 
– Saddam Hussein, drugs, illegal immigrants, 
terrorists, rogue states, dictators who abused hu-
man rights – but without the overriding sense of  
fear and national crisis of  the prior four decades. 
The post September 11 war against terrorism has 
taken on frighteningly similar aspects to the Cold 
War against Communism. 
The anti-terrorism war discourse after Sep-
tember 11, has been adopted in the western infor-
mation sphere, including in Estonia. For instance, 
according to Tiit Hennoste (2008:139) labelling a 
Muslim as a terrorist is widespread in the Estonian 
media. Defence of  democratic values has become 
the general leading principle of  Estonian defence 
policy. Estonia´s leading principle in conducting 
foreign and security policy is the principle of  un-
divided security, the importance of  international 
cooperation and the defence of  democratic values 
(Eesti Riigikaitse 2011).70
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An anti-terrorism war has now replaced the 
Cold War rhetoric and increasing military activity 
is justified by the defence of  democratic values. 
DISCOURSE OF DEFENDING
DEMOCRATIC vALUES 
The present paper observes how the great 
opposition narrative was constructed in the Soviet 
Union and in the world after September 11, 2011 
and which linguistic choices were used to discur-
sively maintain this, how people were mobilized 
and military activity justified. Discursive opposi-
tions are constructed both in the totalitarian So-
viet society, as well as in the modern democratic 
western society in order to justify governmental 
aggressiveness and political interests. 
The Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism ideology 
became absolute in the Soviet Union. It was formu-
lated through the main narrative of  communism 
building. Interdiscursively the discourse of  war 
and fighting dominated. The discourse was upheld 
by reviving the narratives of  the Great Socialist 
October Revolution and the victory of  the Great 
Patriotic War. The order of  discourse was upheld 
through speeches of  leaders, party congresses and 
clearly regulated media broadcasts, because in the 
Soviet Union, media was clearly censored. The he-
gemonic status of  the main narrative was ensured 
because in the Soviet Union there was no opportu-
nity to formulate an alternative narrative. 
The Cold War rhetoric in the Soviet Union 
meant linguistic militarization of  life: interdiscur-
sively war rhetoric penetrated as the language of  
describing everyday life in the media and as a means 
of  mobilizing people. Linguistically, this meant giv-
ing heroic status to work through the following key-
words and permanent constructions: victories at work 
front, working hero, socialist competition, victory of  work, 
army of  workers, etc. Markers of  us in language were: 
peace holders, peace fighters. They were signified as fascists, 
people’s enemies, international imperialism, etc. Use of  lan-
guage was euphemistic: the Soviet Society was de-
scribed as a democratic society, its politics were one 
of  peace and defensive armament. 
For 10 years after the collapse of  the Berlin 
Wall, we lived in a period free of  enemies; then 
a new global opposition was constructed. During 
the Soviet period we fought against international 
imperialism: now we fight against international 
terrorism. Both main narratives, the one of  the 
Soviet Union and the one phrased by George 
Bush, are formulated by the political elite and 
made legitimate through mass media. Both nar-
ratives take place under the auspices of  defending 
democratic values. 
Our-discourse was constructed linguisti-
cally in both societies from the need to defend 
democracy and in the world after 11 September, 
from the need to defend Christian values as well. 
The difference lies in the fact that the border of  
anti-terrorism war relies on the border of  culture 
and perhaps also religions. Instead of  military 
and offensive activity, euphemisms are used. Lin-
guistically military activity is legitimized by the 
need to defend democratic values. 
If  we generalize, we can state that both the 
Soviet and the post-September 11 media followed 
the Soviet propaganda principles of  designing 
and presenting media texts:
● The important aspects in presenting the ma-
terial are self-confidence and, in some topics, 
aggressiveness as well. Self-confidence gives 
an impression of  being infallible and nips 
non-conformity in the bud.
● In order to achieve wide-spread acceptance, 
emotional and fear provoking rhetoric was used.
● It was attempted to create an “us” against 
“them”, by making the recipient of  the mes-
sage choose the “right side”.
● Lies were presented with unaffected self-con-
fidence.
● Tendentious and fabricated single examples 
were presented as general norm. 
● Opposition and different opinions were ignored.
● Emotional influencing was used in order to 
exclude rational analysis.
● Falsifications were used, as long as the recei-
ver of  information could not control what 
was presented. 
● Comments and evaluations were stressed. 
Presenting a fact without comments has a 
short-term effect, but an attitude towards 
the presented facts is remembered for a long 
time. (Lõhmus, 1999: 78.)
After 9/11, there was strong manipulation 
of  public opinion in order to dramatically raise 
military spending, legitimize military intervention 
and pass legislation that imposed severe restrictions 
on civil rights and freedoms. Citizens were manip-
ulated into believing that such measures were tak-
en in order to protect them (van Dijk, 2006: 370). 
There are many books and articles on manipulat-
ing public opinion after the events of  September 
11 (Nafeez Mosadeddeq Ahmed, 2005; Noam 
Chomsky, 2004; Bradley S. Greenberg, 2002; Fred 
Halliday, 2002; Nancy Palmer, 2003; Slavoj Žižek, 
2002; Hodge, Adam and Nilep, Chad, 2006, etc.). 
According to Richard Jackson (2007), the 
term ‘Islamic terrorism’ has become a ubiquitous 71
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feature of  Western political and academic counter-
terrorism discourse. Examining over 300 political 
and academic texts and employing a discourse ana-
lytic approach, Jackson described and dissected the 
central terms, assumptions, labels, narratives and 
genealogical roots of  the language and knowledge 
of  ‘Islamic terrorism’ and reflected on its practical 
and normative consequences. Jackson concluded 
that for the most part, political and academic dis-
courses of  ‘Islamic terrorism’ are unhelpful, not 
least because they are highly politicized, intellectu-
ally contestable, damaging to community relations 
and practically counter-productive.
The examples of  immigration, political vio-
lence and anti-terrorist ideologies involve strong 
opinions, attitudes and ideologies, and are textbook 
examples of  governments and media manipulating 
the population at large, as they also were manipu-
lated by the ‘Red scare’ of  anti-communist ideolo-
gies in the Cold War (Van Dijk, 2006: 370). 
The rationale of  political discourse is intrin-
sically rooted in the consent of  its audience, all the 
more so within a political system that defines and 
frames itself  as democratic. The crucial historical 
moment represented by post 9/11, which saw the 
United States as the principal agent and operator 
on the international scene, is responsible for the 
hardering of  American political rhetoric as one 
of  the distinctive feature of  a ‘securitization’ and 
preventive war programme. (Ferrari, 2007: 606-607). 
The war on terrorism script maintains its 
primacy in guiding u.s. foreign policy. It allows 
the United States – the most military power-
ful nation in human history – to legitimize and 
wage future wars without the need to justify ac-
tions with specific empirical evidence. (Chang, 
Mehan, 2006: 19).
Noam Chomski (2002: 74) defines terror-
ism as something that “they use against us” and 
where “we and our allies are the main victims of  
terrorism”. Such justification is used to legitimize 
military activity to protect society, an attack is jus-
tified euphemistically with the need for preventive 
defence. In every society military activity, first and 
foremost, serves the cause of  increasing political 
and economic influence; social agents justify it 
with noble causes such as the need for preventive 
defensive activity and the need to defend demo-
cratic values. 
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